Donald Trump just won the presidency. Our experts answer the big questions about what that means for America’s role in the world.

Get ready for the sequel. On November 6, the Associated Press declared Donald Trump the winner of the 2024 US presidential election. A transition now kicks off as world events continue to churn. When he returns to the presidency on January 20, Trump’s inbox will be full of global challenges. How will he respond? And what will the consequences be? Below, our experts provide answers across twenty-four of the most significant policy matters awaiting the next administration.

What the next administration will do about…

US leadership in the world

What can we expect from a Trump 2.0 foreign policy? In defense and security policy, we can anticipate a return of a “peace through strength” approach. This will mean big investments in US defense capabilities to strengthen deterrence and use force decisively if deterrence fails. Trump will rightly ask allies to contribute more to ensure US alliances in Europe and Asia have the capabilities they need.

In economic policy, we can expect a focus on fair and reciprocal trade, prioritizing addressing China’s unfair trading practices, and an unleashing of the United States’ domestic energy potential. Values will center around an “America first, but not alone” orientation that will ensure that US global engagement benefits the peace, prosperity, and freedom of the American people and, in so doing, the broader free world.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Global trade

What will the Trump administration do about global trade? This is the thirty-trillion-dollar question. It was what every finance minister and central bank governor at the recent International Monetary Fund-World Bank Annual Meetings wanted to chat about privately. Here’s what we know. 

The important question about Trump and trade is: Will he do what he says he will do on tariffs? That answer is more likely yes than no, but it will not happen overnight. Trump’s trade views were shaped in the 1980s during Japan’s rapid economic growth. He views trade in binary terms, with bilateral imbalances the key determinant of whether a policy is succeeding or not. The first step in his trade policy will be, somewhat surprisingly, to try and revise the Phase 1 trade deal with China that he brokered at the end of his first term. The deal was largely judged a failure since China didn’t live up to any of its commitments, but the excuse given is that the pandemic prevented what would have been a successful first step. That’s more likely initially than a 60 percent tariff on Chinese imports.

Once he tries to revive (or, as Trump trade people say, “finally enforce”) the China trade deal, Trump will turn his attention to the European Union. Here there will be a deep divide, and Trump will seek reciprocal tariffs on a range of products—many of which he will be able to impose unilaterally. His blanket tariff promise of 10 percent seems unlikely in the near term, but instead a scattershot of specific tariffs will be a signal to countries—both allies and adversaries—that this is just the beginning. The likely response will be a tit-for-tat escalation that will be inflationary in the United States and for the global economy. While the Trump economic team disputes this, citing the fact that Trump’s first term didn’t produce inflationary results, the size and scale of what is being proposed now is vastly different.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.

The war in Ukraine

The greatest national security threat to the United States, its fellow NATO members, and other US allies is the increasingly aggressive partnership of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The focal point of this threat is Ukraine, where Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest is just a prelude to more provocations and, potentially even war further west, against NATO’s eastern states. A victory in Ukraine for Russia, which is now bolstered by North Korean troops soon to be fighting in Europe, will encourage a Chinese move on Taiwan.

It is not clear that Trump fully acknowledges this challenge. But whether he understands it or not, his administration will have to deal with it and its most dangerous point of confrontation: Ukraine. It is difficult to anticipate Trump’s policy on the war because his team contains personnel with very different views. One group advocates sharply reducing aid to Ukraine—a view many associate with Trump. This group is naive about the Kremlin’s policy toward the United States—Putin states plainly that the United States is adversary number one—and clueless about the danger of a Kremlin victory in Ukraine. The other camp recognizes the threat to US interests in Europe and elsewhere if Washington were to abandon Ukraine. This group would pursue a Reaganesque policy of peace through strength and, unlike the Biden team, not be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear bluster. The first clues about Trump’s policy will be the appointments he makes to senior national security positions.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

NATO

For much of the past year, Europeans have been asking if NATO can be “Trump-proofed,” hoping they would never have to find out. But with Trump on his way back to the White House, European leaders, in particular NATO’s new secretary general, Mark Rutte, will have to show they have a plan to work with the new administration.

The first thing to note about the new Trump administration’s NATO policy is that anyone claiming to know definitively what that policy will be—beyond the inevitable calls for Europeans to shoulder more of the Alliance’s responsibilities—should be treated with significant skepticism. Trump’s diplomatic approach is to always keep others—friend and foe alike—off balance. It is to make a virtue of unpredictability. For an Alliance that prizes stability and reliability, NATO (especially Rutte) will have to relearn how to deal with Trump’s brinkmanship, drama, and unpredictability.

The second is to acknowledge that Trump world’s leading foreign policy practitioners are not monolithic. Views on NATO among potential administration personnel range from the true-believing, isolationist “America first” crowd (in reality a relatively small group in elite circles), to the “division of labor” school (which holds that the United States needs to focus exclusively on the Indo-Pacific and leave Europe to the Europeans), to the Reaganite Cold Warriors. Vice President-elect JD Vance has straddled these first two groups. While he recently reaffirmed his commitment to NATO, he also said that the United States needed to recognize that NATO is “not just a welfare client” and that “it should be a real alliance.” The relative sway of these differing factions will have significant bearing on the policy direction of the new administration.

—Philippe Dickinson is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served on the political team at the British Embassy in Washington, DC.

Competition with China

Trump’s policy toward China in his second administration will likely be similar to the approach during his first term. He has already shown a continued fixation on trade and outlined a plan to impose high tariffs, which will reignite disputes with Beijing over this issue and likely prompt retaliation against US businesses. In other respects, Trump may actually ease tensions with China—but not to the benefit of US strategic interests. Trump’s stated Russia-friendly position on the war in Ukraine will remove a point of contention with Beijing but also serve Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s geopolitical agenda. Trump has already signaled a lack of support for Taiwan and seems to believe that he can deter Chinese military action through personal charisma. Xi is not likely to be bedazzled, and Trump’s display of weakness could embolden Beijing to take an even more aggressive stance toward the island’s democratic government. More broadly, Trump’s overt contempt for Washington’s traditional allies will likely complicate collective action toward China and open divisions for Xi to exploit and expand Chinese global influence. Trump promises a focus on issues of minimal strategic importance to the United States that nevertheless will lead to Beijing and Washington bickering, along with a withdrawal of US global leadership that allows Xi to promote Chinese power at Washington’s expense.

—Michael Schuman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a contributing writer at the Atlantic.

Iran

The return of Trump is likely to quickly evoke memories of his maximum-pressure campaign and killing of Iranian Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. It is a clear possibility that Trump would immediately return to a maximum-pressure campaign in which sanctions would not just increase but be enforced.

One of the first major decisions facing Trump vis-a-vis Iran is the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231’s snapback mechanism in October 2025, which allows for the reimposition of sanctions due to Iranian non-performance under the nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The big question will be whether to join with European counterparts and invoke the snapback. Russia and China are almost certain to reject doing so, but Trump and his team are very likely to favor such a policy.

However, Trump and his national security team may struggle to find the same level of support in the region that they had four years ago. At the time, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were united behind Trump’s efforts to more aggressively take on Iran and Iranian interests. But following the end of the Saudi blockade on Qatar and what was viewed by Riyadh as insufficient US support after an attack by Iranian-supported Houthi terrorists on Saudi oil infrastructure at Abqaiq (which was followed a year into Biden’s term with a Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi), most wealthy Gulf state allies have turned inward and are seeking to calm tensions with Iran.

As a result, the incoming Trump administration may be unable to recreate its full network of allies to undertake an intensive anti-Iran policy, especially if the policy does not contain a clear end goal of reaching a comprehensive deal with Iran. Many policy officials in the president-elect’s orbit are likely to balk at the idea of new negotiations with Iran, but that does not mean Trump wouldn’t consider it eventually. More than anything, Trump wants to make a deal. He would probably relish the opportunity to stand in Tehran and boast about his ability to conclude a deal no one else could. But such an occasion, if it ever happened, would likely be quite far off, because it would mean Trump having to first put aside the memory of Iran seeking his assassination. That’s something that Trump, and the people around him, will focus on for a long time to come.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Relations with the EU

Trump’s return to the White House will pose a significant challenge for the European Union (EU). The US-EU relationship will become much less strategic and much less all-encompassing. Instead, EU and member state leaders will have to expend political capital at home and in Washington to make progress. And things will get worse quickly before they get better. Trump may well make good on his threat of imposing tariffs on the bloc, which would pressure Brussels into retaliation and a tit-for-tat trade war. The Trump administration will also probably not look kindly on existing initiatives that the EU enjoyed with the Biden administration, and many in the Trump circle aiming for top jobs are no friends of Brussels. The EU will no longer have a strategic partner by default, including in its support for Ukraine or ambitions for EU defense, economic security, or the green transition. Paradoxically, the Trump administration will also likely demand more from the EU—on trade, China policy, support for Ukraine if US aid is to continue, and more.

Another Trump presidency does not preclude cooperation, but the Trump team will see the relationship through a much more transactional lens. Deals will be possible if Europe’s leaders manage to stay disciplined, cut through the inevitable noise of the president’s rhetoric and their own domestic reactions, and come ready to negotiate. The EU will have to prioritize a few key areas reflecting Trump’s priorities—from a handful of trade sectors to strengthening its posture toward China. EU and European leaders will have to decide which anti-European and anti-EU rhetoric to ignore and when to step in to protect the EU’s unity. Regardless, there is plenty the incoming Trump administration and the EU can and should do together, and the Trump team may realize they need the EU and the Europeans more than they think if Washington is to take on the likes of China.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Digital currencies

Trump changed his tune on crypto this election cycle, going from a nonbeliever to a full-on convert—most notably through the launch of his own cryptocurrency company, World Liberty Financial, in September. This shift came amid the industry’s emergence as a major political player (one crypto Super PAC, Fairshake, has raised more than $200 million this election cycle) and its whole-hearted embrace of Trump—which is not surprising, given the libertarian ideals that sparked and continue to sustain the crypto world. Trump has also indicated that he would be open to a Bitcoin strategic reserve, much like the petroleum one currently in place. 

Moving beyond rhetoric, the task at hand for the Trump administration is to signal deregulation through regulation by passing at least one of the many bills on stablecoin and cryptocurrency regulation currently under consideration in Congress, some of which have bipartisan support. This approach would likely also entail appointing crypto-friendly heads of agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 

On the other hand, the Republican Party’s position on the issue of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is straightforward: ban them, since they could potentially control every aspect of your life. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 proposes a CBDC ban, and states like Indiana, Florida, and Alabama have passed legislation opposing the use of or experimentation with CBDCs. This May, the Republican-controlled House passed the CBDC Anti-Surveillance Act, which, if it becomes law, would make the United States the only country to ban a CBDC. While much depends on the composition of Congress, it’s highly unlikely that the United States will issue a retail digital dollar under the Trump presidency, and the Federal Reserve will become more cautious about even researching one. 

—Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for the future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Artificial intelligence

The second Trump administration will likely chart a different course on AI than the one taken over the past four years. Trump has historically favored limited government regulation, emphasizing AI as a tool to strengthen US competitiveness, particularly against China. Trump’s approach to AI will center on dismantling the Biden administration’s regulatory measures, which he and many of his supporters view as stifling innovation. Instead, Trump will prioritize the “free speech and human flourishing” ethos from the Republican Party platform, likely advocating for self-regulation within the tech industry and giving companies wide leeway to innovate without oversight constraints. Trump’s administration will also strategically boost energy production to fuel an AI race more driven by national competitiveness than international standards. Rather than engaging in multilateral AI forums, Trump will favor a US-centric approach, aiming for victory over China in an AI race and establishing independent US dominance. This will spill over into the national security domain, where Trump will seek to enhance military capabilities and maintain a strong technical edge over any and all geopolitical adversaries.

—Raul Brens Jr. is the acting senior director and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Climate change

On the campaign trail, Trump promised to repeal federal regulations on greenhouse-gas emissions, lambasted the Green New Deal as the “greatest scam in history,” and committed to boosting fossil-fuel production. However, his administration will need to consider the danger of these actions. Climate change is global. Regardless of where greenhouse gasses are coming from, climate inaction will impact the entire planet, including the United States. Climate change impacts livelihoods and daily finances, damages infrastructure, costs taxpayers, and reduces national security. Every three weeks, climate disasters create one billion dollars of damage. Annually, it costs the United States $150 billion. Soberingly, that is likely an underestimation. The Trump administration will find that it cannot overlook these concerns. If the United States steps back on its climate leadership, it will be difficult—if not impossible—to phase down fossil fuels and halt global warming, not just in the next four years but also for future US administrations. We cannot afford that. Trump has an opportunity to revisit his proposed plans and instead focus on investing in sustainable infrastructure, mobilizing the sustainable energy sector, and reducing national emissions.

—Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief adviser and climate negotiator to the government of Peru.

The energy transition

Trump’s election will reinvigorate a debate around US “energy independence” as he renews government support for the oil and gas industry and doubles down on bipartisan progress around the deployment of nuclear technology as well. Overall, his administration is likely to favor conventional energy resources over emissions-free alternatives, expediting liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports and oil-and-gas production licenses while potentially clawing back unspent Inflation Reduction Act funds. But the reality is that the ongoing transformation of the global energy system largely transcends Washington’s political cycles.

The US exit from the Paris Agreement, for example, was a signature feature of Trump’s first-term energy and climate policy and an act that is all but certain to be reinstituted early next year. But around the world, the price of energy and the security of supply tend to outweigh the impact of US engagement in multilateral fora, hinting at why deployment of solar and wind energy in the United States grew by 66 percent over the course of Trump’s first term. 

One exception moving forward, however, will be Trump’s use of tariffs to boost US manufacturing and foster job growth. Trump-era tariffs focused on Chinese electric vehicles and solar technologies have endured throughout Biden’s presidency. With the interplay of climate and trade policy only growing closer since Trump’s first term, it’s all but inevitable that his second administration will go further in deploying trade-related tools to strengthen US energy dominance. How the world—in particular China—reacts will be critical to the scale and pace of the energy transition.

—Landon Derentz is the senior director and Morningstar chair for global energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy on the White House National Security Council.

Global democracy promotion

In a second Trump administration, we can expect a shift toward a more constrained and transactional model of democracy promotion, with a primary focus on strategic interests over global democratization efforts. Trump’s previous tenure demonstrated a tendency to prioritize national security and economic leverage. We can expect more of the same in his second term. 

US global democracy promotion is likely to remain inconsistent, which will further jeopardize progress on US engagement with the Global South. Trump will probably distance himself from Biden’s rhetorical framing of the United States leading a contest “between democracy and autocracy.” This approach is apt to make US support for global democracy initiatives more selective, concentrating on regions and countries where efforts align closely with US economic and security interests. These targeted initiatives may achieve faster, more measurable results than broad symbolic gatherings. In practice, Trump is likely to prioritize economic stability and regulatory reforms in countries with strong trade or investment ties to the United States, safeguarding US interests while promoting democratic functions aligned with these priorities. This approach contrasts with the Biden administration’s broader democracy agenda, which includes social issues like LGBTQI+ rights and climate change.

—Joseph Lemoine is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Taiwan

A Trump presidency will entail significant uncertainty for Taiwan. Strategically, the Trump administration’s transactionalist tendencies mean that the president-elect expects US support for Taiwan to come at a price, and be decided on a case-by-case basis, rather than to stem from a partnership based on more enduring considerations. 

Economically, Trump has repeatedly criticized Taiwan’s semiconductor industry for stealing American jobs. Combined with Trump’s demonstrated inclination to use tariffs as his economic-policy instrument of choice, his election signals that there may be greater punitive tariff policies coming against the Taiwanese economy’s champions, thereby complicating Taipei’s international economic integration.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

US-Turkey relations

Trump’s victory will create further uncertainty in Turkish-US relations. In the first Trump administration, bilateral relations hit bottom because of a series of incidents including visa restrictions, US sanctions against Turkey, the arrest of a US pastor in the country, and several Trump tweets threatening to destroy the already fragile Turkish economy. My hope is that the relationship between these two strategic allies, which faces many challenges, including a lack of mutual trust, will be smoother over the course of the second Trump administration.

There is a general belief in Turkey that another Trump administration will be good for the relationship simply because Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appreciate strong counterparts, and therefore each will be able to communicate with the other directly and frequently. However, Trump’s positions on the Ukraine war, NATO, and the Gaza conflict are clear.

Despite its relationship with Russia, Turkey maintains a balancing act in the war in Ukraine—which Trump has vowed to end quickly—by providing drones and equipment to Kyiv. Turkey has the second-biggest military in NATO and plays a major role in the Alliance’s southern flank, but that might not mean much for the new president-elect, a frequent critic of NATO. Turkey’s position in favor of Hamas in its war with Israel also won’t play well with the new administration, which is clearly leaning closer to the Netanyahu government in the conflict. Efforts to normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia also may hit snags under the Trump administration, given the pro-Armenian positions Trump took during the election campaign. 

The recent terror attack in Ankara by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), recognized as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States, has made already fragile relations between the two countries even more complicated. One of the major points of contention in US-Turkey relations is US support for the YPG/PYD—a group viewed as the Syrian wing of the PKK—in the US fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey accuses the United States of providing weapons and equipment to the Kurdish militia in Syria that are then used against Turkish targets. The Trump administration may adopt a stance in this dispute that is more favorable to Turkey.

The road ahead for the relationship will remain challenging, and both sides will need to invest more in it regardless of how frequently the countries’ presidents communicate.

—Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey.

Venezuela

Exactly how Trump will approach Venezuela remains to be seen. On the one hand, in his first administration he led a maximum-pressure campaign on Venezuelan ruler Nicolás Maduro, which ramped up financial, oil, and individual sanctions against the government and key regime figures. On the other hand, in recent months he has notably refrained from publicly promising a return to this approach. On the campaign trail, his remarks on Venezuela largely focused  on the flow of migrants and refugees from the country, with Trump claiming that the country’s crime rate has plummeted because so many Venezuelan “criminals” have come to the United States. This, combined with the fact that former Trump officials have said that he became frustrated with the Venezuelan opposition and with the failure of the pressure campaign to achieve results, could point to a second Trump administration adopting a more transactional approach to Caracas. The Trump administration, after all, on multiple occasions engaged in backchannel talks with Maduro, and Trump himself expressed interest in meeting Maduro face to face back in 2020. Ultimately, while it is likely that Trump will adopt more confrontational rhetoric on Venezuela, he may see more value in containing the outward flow of migration and securing a US and Western footprint in Venezuela’s oil sector than in reverting to a maximum-pressure approach.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

North Korea

Want to know what the next US administration’s policy toward North Korea will be? Look to Pyongyang, not Washington. Neither presidential candidate spoke much about North Korea on the campaign trail, and Trump doesn’t seem to be planning to make it a priority—unsurprisingly, given the many other major issues competing for the White House’s attention and the apparent intractability of the problem posed by Pyongyang. 

But North Korea has a way of forcing itself onto a president’s agenda and compelling presidents to react. It’s worth recalling, for example, that then-President Trump’s memorable “fire and fury” rhetoric directed at Kim Jong Un in 2017 was in response to a campaign of North Korean missile and nuclear tests that had begun in 2016 before he took office and continued into 2017. Similarly, while Trump had expressed openness to meeting with Kim even before taking office, his first summit with the North Korean leader in 2018 came about because he accepted an offer from Kim—conveyed by South Korean officials—rather than pushing for the meeting himself. 

Just because a new US president is taking office doesn’t mean Pyongyang will back away from a range of efforts that challenge US interests: sending troops and munitions to support Russia’s war against Ukraine; aligning with Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran against the United States while increasing the risk of simultaneous conflicts; continuing to threaten South Korea; and enhancing its nuclear and missile forces. 

North Korea, however, will not charge along heedlessly. Its leaders are skilled at keeping their actions just at the level where they may trigger headlines but not truly strong responses—as demonstrated by recent launches of short-range missiles and an intercontinental ballistic missile, along with an escalating commitment of artillery shells, then missiles, and then troops to Russia. There is reason to expect that North Korea may even escalate further to limited aggression against South Korea. We also cannot rule out North Korea embarking on a new, tactical charm offensive directed primarily at Washington to prevent a unified and strong US and international response even while Kim remains committed to these overall lines of effort.

The question is whether North Korea’s actions next year will be dramatic enough to provoke a focused response from the White House—perhaps in the form of a military confrontation followed by negotiations, if the past is prologue—or if these actions will remain below the threshold of triggering much of a response from the new administration, thereby allowing North Korea to set a “new normal” at a higher level of dangerous behavior. Either way, history and logic suggest that Kim will have the initiative, and the new US administration will be reacting to him rather than charting its own course on North Korea policy.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and served as the US government’s national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2014 to 2020.

The Abraham Accords between Israel and Arab nations

The Abraham Accords will likely serve as a key pillar of US policy in the Middle East for the Trump administration. Knowing that the Accords were among the foremost policy successes during Trump’s first term, the administration will prioritize enhancing and expanding the Accords, with a particular focus on securing agreements with key players such as Saudi Arabia. 

While the Trump administration will pursue opportunities to engage Palestinian leadership and bring an end to the Israel-Hamas war, it will not see a peace agreement as a necessary precursor for expanding the Accords. Instead, Trump will focus on creating a regional alliance against Iranian influence, leveraging recent Iranian and proxy actions across the region to entice new members with weapons agreements. Additionally, the new administration will likely explore initiatives that foster trade and investment among signatory nations to bolster new and existing agreements.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

US-India relations

A second Trump term will likely bring a transactional approach to US-India relations. Expect an intensified focus on trade negotiations centered around market access and tariffs—potentially revisiting issues such as access to various Indian sectors and trade preferences granted to India as well as immigration.

If Trump does pull back from the Indo-Pacific—by, for example, ceding ground to China on Taiwan—this could inadvertently push India to fill the void. This could come in the form of India strengthening military ties with Southeast Asian nations or the other “Quad” countries, Japan and Australia. At the same time, Trump’s “America First” approach could complicate broader multilateral engagements and climate discussions. Defense cooperation, particularly arms sales and joint exercises, would likely continue as a central pillar of the US-India relationship. But India’s balancing act between its strategic autonomy and deepening US ties could face more strain under the Trump administration.

India would have been fine with either outcome, but now it can celebrate the rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump. Expect Modi’s government to focus on working with Trump on countering China (potentially using the China Plus One strategy to deal with trade tensions) and establishing India’s strength in the Indo-Pacific.

—Srujan Palkar is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Relations with Africa

One in four people on the planet is projected to be African by 2050. That demographic—and economic—opportunity is appealing to Trump, particularly given his increasing focus on competition with China, which is making its own inroads on the continent. Trump is likely to “unleash as much of that youthful energy as possible” in his second term by streamlining regulations and encouraging business development and trade with Africa, as former Republican Congressman Vin Weber recently wrote for the Atlantic Council’s AfricaSource section.

One big moment to watch will be the 2025 reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). While Trump is more prone to bilateral trade deals than sprawling agreements, Weber wrote that AGOA “is finding broader and deeper support in the business communities on both continents,” so “there is no reason to believe that Trump would seek to weaken” the trade deal.

—Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

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US-Mexico relations

A second Trump administration with JD Vance as vice president (both Trump and Vance have floated sending the US military into Mexico) is likely to prioritize harsh immigration and trade policies in its relations with Mexico. The two issues would be explicitly tied. Building upon his previous term’s initiatives, such as the “Remain in Mexico” policy and the construction of the border wall, Trump may seek to implement more aggressive measures to curb illegal immigration and may take advantage of the upcoming US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) review period to demand more of Mexico in terms of immigration enforcement. Though he has talked about mass deportations and the use of military forces to enforce border security, it is unclear how he would operationalize these policies.

On trade, Trump’s “America First” approach may lead to a dramatic renegotiation of the USMCA, and he may strain ties with Mexico by imposing higher tariffs on Mexican imports in the name of protecting US industries. For the incoming Trump-Vance administration, the relationship with Mexico will be transactional and zero-sum.  

—María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director of operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

Immigration

Trump will move quickly to “begin the largest deportation operation in the history” of the United States. If Trump follows through on his past statements, even those who are now here legally but were paroled in from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela will quickly find their legal status revoked and be ordered to leave. Initially, deportations will target those with criminal records. But the Biden administration has already prioritized those cases, so the Trump administration will quickly turn to other undocumented people—and this is where the trouble will start. Watch to see if the 2018 policy of separating children from their parents comes back, especially for undocumented spouses or parents with US-citizen spouses or children. (Trump surrogate Tom Homan told CBS’s 60 Minutes that Trump’s answer will be to deport the US-citizen children along with their parents.) As Trump administration officials ramp up detentions, look out for whether they set up mass detention camps in Texas, the only border state with a Republican governor. The breaking point will occur if the courts order the Trump administration to halt deportations but Trump decides to ignore court orders and proceed anyway. That would provoke a backlash of extraordinary proportions.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the Department of Homeland Security.

Nuclear weapons

The question is not whether the Trump administration will expand US nuclear forces but rather when and by how much. At a minimum, expect the Trump administration to continue what it likely sees as the unfinished business of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): the development of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The SLCM-N was delayed by bureaucracy in the Trump administration, canceled by the Biden administration, and then nonetheless funded and mandated by Congress. With a cooperative administration, the development of this capability could move more quickly. It is also possible that the Trump administration will direct the expansion of the US strategic nuclear force. In a Foreign Affairs piece, former Trump National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien called for maintaining US “technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles” and considering a resumption of nuclear testing. The New START arms-control agreement with Russia expires in February 2026 with no replacement on the horizon, so that could be the starting point of a US buildup. The incoming Trump administration will likely embrace the 2018 NPR’s affirmation of modernizing the US nuclear arsenal and maintaining the nuclear triad (silo-, bomber-, and submarine-based nuclear forces), as well as its rejection of the notions that the United States should rule out using nuclear weapons first in a conflict or declare that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States or its allies.

—Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Nuclear energy

Nuclear energy policy has enjoyed bipartisan consensus in Washington over the last two administrations. With the second Trump administration on the horizon, more bipartisan legislation in support of nuclear energy will likely be passed by Congress and signed into law by Trump, along the same lines as the legislation on nuclear energy that was a hallmark of Trump’s first administration.

The Trump administration passed a number of pieces of legislation, with bipartisan backing, on nuclear energy policy. The Energy Act of 2020 provided $6.6 billion in funding for all stages of nuclear reactor development and included provisions for nuclear fuel and funding for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program; the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act of 2019 was aimed at streamlining the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2018 cut regulatory costs and tried to streamline the siting process for next generation nuclear reactors.

The outcome of congressional elections may have a greater impact on nuclear energy policy in the coming years. For example, the US Export-Import Bank—which provides loans for US nuclear projects overseas and has previously faced opposition from some Republicans—is up for reauthorization by Congress in 2026, and it will also need three of its four board members to be appointed in January 2025. Ultimately, nuclear energy policy champions should continue to engage with the new administration, especially highlighting the role of nuclear energy in US national security, in order to continue the momentum of the last several years.

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

US grand strategy

Grand strategy rarely comes up on the campaign trail, but whatever hints Trump offered for how he would approach it pale in comparison with this reality: The post-Cold War “holiday from history” is over, and the world has entered a period of protracted systemic instability, with increasingly fragile regional power balances and the risk of great-power conflict growing exponentially. These dynamics will compel the next administration to recognize, when crafting the United States’ national security strategy, that geopolitics has returned with a vengeance. They will require articulating the country’s irreducible national interests, while identifying the key theaters the United States needs to shape and the resources it must bring to bear to achieve its strategic objectives. Urgent priorities will include reassessing unstable regional balances and genuinely reconsidering the organization of US relationships with adversaries, allies, and partners. US strategy will also need to address continuing economic turbulence, especially as it impacts the reliability of supply chains. 

—Andrew Michta is the director of and a senior fellow in the Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Further reading

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Image: Then Republican presidential nominee and former US President Donald Trump points his finger following early results from the 2024 US presidential election in Palm Beach County Convention Center, in West Palm Beach, Florida, on November 6, 2024. Photo via REUTERS/Carlos Barria.